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Losing discipline 
Undisciplined research: the proceduralisation of 
quality control in transdisciplinary projects 
Michael Guggenheim
In this paper I argue that so-called trans-
disciplinary research, that is problem-oriented, 
non-technological research outside the discipli-
nary structure, leads to a strengthening of organ-
isational aspects of knowledge production and, 
particularly, of a change in quality standards. 
Quality standards are increasingly defined in 
intra-organisational or project-dependent and 
procedural instead of disciplinary terms. The  
paper is based on fieldwork in several environ-
mental consulting companies that perform a 
broad, non-disciplinary spectrum of research 
and consulting. Although they perform govern-
ment-funded research, neither their organisa-
tional structure nor their praxis is oriented 
towards disciplines. Instead their research  
focuses on social problems and methods that are 
translated into research without an intermediary 
disciplinary filtering. Quality has to be accom-
plished via non-disciplinary standards. These 
non-disciplinary standards are all procedural: 
namely quality management, timesheets and ac-
companying supervisory groups. 
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RANSDISCIPLINARITY is often hailed as a 
new way of knowledge production, replacing 
the old, narrow, disciplinary boundaries of 
knowledge production with a new type that is sup-
posedly closer to societal needs. Such definitions of 
transdisciplinarity obviously rest on certain assump-
tions about disciplinary knowledge production. Dis-
ciplines, in this view, are seen as restraining 
mechanisms whose specific theories, instruments 
and methods constrain what can be known. 
According to this view, disciplines do not allow 
the creation of new research questions but restrict 
the different ways of knowledge production and sub-
ject them to a disciplining logic. Disciplinary  
science is described as remote from societal needs, 
because it splits dense problems into disciplinary 
chunks, each missing the problem as a whole. Disci-
plines are thus seen as a device that prevents grasp-
ing the ‘whole’ problem. Transdisciplinarity in 
contrast is seen as a way to overcome the narrow-
ness of disciplines, to circumscribe a problem in its 
real form and to address it without disciplinary  
restrictions. 
However, as I seek to show in this article, if 
transdisciplinarity is not just freestyle knowledge 
production out of the blue, similar to a private lan-
guage, it is also dependent on constraining factors. 
No research project has endless resources and end-
less intellectual capacities. There are no theories of 
everything and no catch-all methods. Thus, even in 
a transdisciplinary research project, time and 
money are limited, some methods have to be ap-
plied and others not, some details have to be left 
out and some issues can be touched on only in very 
approximate ways. And in the end, somehow the 
results have to be assessed. 
T
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In this article I focus on the last issue. The as-
sessment of results in disciplinary research depends 
on disciplinary peer review. The assessments of re-
sults demands that the assessor is knowledgeable 
about the field of research, which is what the disci-
plinary organisation of science provides for. Since 
such disciplinary peers are not available in transdis-
ciplinary research, other, non-scientific mechanisms 
are employed. By ‘non-scientific’ I do not imply that 
transdisciplinarity is bad science; rather, that the 
control of quality is shifted in transdisciplinarity re-
search to agents and mechanisms outside scientific 
organisations. Also, since these agents cannot judge 
results, quality control is shifted to other parts of 
research, namely organisational and procedural is-
sues. In the absence of sound judgments of results 
procedural measures become indicators of quality.  
The test case for this argument is provided by  
environmental consultancies. These firms pursue 
environmental research independent of disciplines 
and close to their clients; they provide thus an ideal-
typical  case of transdisciplinary research. 
I will first introduce the theoretical problem in 
greater detail, putting emphasis on the question as to 
why transdisciplinarity is thought of as different 
from disciplinary science. Second, I will briefly in-
troduce the field of environmental consultants. The 
main part of the article discusses three different 
ways of quality assessment in environmental consul-
tancies and how this affects knowledge production. 
These are: quality management systems, timesheets 
and advisory boards. All three mechanisms lead to a 
proceduralisation of quality control, which is linked 
to its position outside disciplinary science. 
Differences in quality control 
Disciplinary knowledge production works under the 
assumption of the autonomy of science.1 By this I do 
not imply that disciplinary science is completely 
independent of the rest of society, nor that there are 
no connections between research themes and socie-
tal problems. But disciplinary science knows a spe-
cific routine to create autonomy. It is disciplinary 
peers, and not outsiders, who judge disciplinary 
knowledge production. The peers decide about fund-
ing, publishing and evaluating research and re-
searchers. The quality of work is judged through a 
grant-application process and a peer-review process 
of books and articles.2 It is other scientists who set 
the standards for a discipline. 
Disciplines are furthermore international in scope, 
and open for everyone who is considered to belong 
to a certain discipline. ‘Membership’ is acquired 
through training and labeling and thus open to con-
test, unlike in organisations, where it is unambigu-
ous. The autonomy of the scientific disciplines also 
leads to the often-despised disciplinary boundaries 
and narrow-mindedness.3 The autonomy of science 
is the autonomy of scientific disciplines. 
Interdisciplinarity transcends these constraints, 
through fusion or collaboration between different 
disciplines. As Peter Weingart has argued, interdis-
ciplinarity is an early stage in the life of a new disci-
pline (Weingart, 1987). Interdisciplinarity is only an 
in-between stage where disciplinary constraints are 
unclear or confused. Once the new discipline has 
been formed, it resembles the existing ones, and 
loses its interdisciplinary character. It develops its 
own associations, canon, introductory books, auton-
omy and boundaries. 
Transdisciplinarity, as I understand it here, ex-
pands the notion of interdisciplinarity by introducing 
actors outside of science as an integral part of 
knowledge production (Gibbons et al, 1994: 167f; 
Klein et al, 2001: 4; Pohl, 2001).4 The difference 
between disciplinary and transdisciplinary science is 
not the relevance of research results nor their appli-
cability. The difference is that it is not only scientists 
who define research questions, theories and methods 
but also lay people, or other stakeholders, to use a 
popular word in these circles, who introduce other 
criteria for choosing methods and theories. 
Transdisciplinarity, like interdisciplinarity, is only 
possible after the system of disciplines has been put 
in place. There may always have been research that 
fits the above criteria for transdisciplinarity. But as 
long as there were no disciplinary border controls, 
there could be no urge to transcend these borders.5 
Transdisciplinarity is a break with the view of 
autonomous science. The main reason for this break 
is the insight that science is said to have become too 
autonomous, meaningless or out of touch with socie-
tal problems. The integration of actors outside of 
science leads to different ways of discussing and 
evaluating scientific work, since scientific issues are 
by definition out of place. Obviously, persons work-
ing outside scientific organisations may contribute to 
research without changing any scientific criteria, but 
such research is not transdisciplinarity, it is just re-
search done by non-university people. 
Transdisciplinarity is also different from applied 
science and technology or the work of professions. 
It is different from technology, because transdisci-
plinary knowledge is not testable by whether it 
works; it cannot be patented. Transdisciplinary 
knowledge is knowledge that relates to the world as 
disciplinary knowledge does: it adds different de-
scriptions, which enable different actions. Transdis-
ciplinarity is also different from the work of 
professions, such as medicine or law. The work of 
professions is defined through complex problems, 
which are not solved by inventing new technologies, 
but with case-specific treatment (Abbott, 1988: 8). 
Professions are defined through a relatively clear-
cut distinction between themselves and a university-
based discipline. The discipline creates the space in 
which the autonomy of professions, that is, their 
independence from being overtaken by practical 
problems, is secured (Stichweh, 1994). Transdisci-
plinarity is similar to professional work because it is 
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case-specific, but it lacks a direct link to a single 
academic discipline. Transdisciplinarity is thus a 
way of producing knowledge, which can neither be 
fully controlled by disciplinary standards nor by a 
test of its functionality. 
The question then is: how is transdisciplinary 
work carried out and how is its quality assessed, if 
there is neither a test of its functioning nor a separa-
tion between a profession and a scientific branch? I 
want to show in this paper that the switch to non-
scientific mechanisms that ensure transdisciplinary 
knowledge production involves a switch to proce-
dural mechanisms. Procedural mechanisms emerge 
because of a lack of an external common vantage 
point for the judgment of research that is usually 
provided by a discipline. There is neither a discipli-
nary truth to refer to, nor a common habitus that 
would coordinate the judgments.  
Furthermore, because transdisciplinary research is 
usually not replicable due to its local and time-
bound character, the process of transdisciplinary 
research itself becomes the object of evaluation. And 
because the process is not controlled by a discipline, 
the features to control are formal instead of content-
bound. The practices of work become the focus of 
quality control, not the results. The switch to proce-
dural mechanisms such as quality management sys-
tems, timesheets and supervisory groups described 
below is not simply an outcome of an economisation 
of science and the introduction of organisational 
methods that are foreign to research. The procedural 
mechanisms are the result of the transdisciplinary 
character of this type of research. They take the seat 
that peer review occupied in disciplinary research. 
This is a stark contrast to the output-oriented 
mechanisms of only peer-review-based science.  
The procedural character of these mechanisms has 
important consequences for how transdisciplinary 
research is done and for how we conceive the pro-
duction of knowledge. 
Environmental consultancies 
The empirical material in this article is taken from 
fieldwork on environmental consultancies in Swit-
zerland.6 The material is based on interviews with 
representatives of 20 different companies and on 
extended fieldwork in four different companies. The 
presentation here focuses not on differences between 
the companies, but on their commonalities and what 
separates them from disciplinary science.7 
Environmental consultancies are private compa-
nies that perform research on environmental issues.8 
Environmental consultancies provide interesting ma-
terial for an analysis of transdisciplinarity because 
they can perform much more ‘pure’ transdisciplinary 
work than universities since they do not suffer from 
the organisational restrictions of disciplinary univer-
sity science. Environmental consultancies operate on 
the borderline of research and consulting, being  
political pressure groups and independent experts  
all at the same time. They thus provide an often 
overlooked but almost ideal typical case for trans-
disciplinarity. 
Environmental consultancies are historically a  
direct reaction to the perceived narrowness of disci-
plinary knowledge production. They emerged from 
the 1970s onwards together with the new environ-
mental discourse reacting to the overt reluctance of 
academic science in Switzerland to confront envi-
ronmental issues.9 From the viewpoint of the foun-
ders of the consultancies, academic science was 
overly scientistic, not political enough and shying 
away from solving the huge problems of pollution 
and environmental degradation. Thus some natural 
scientists founded companies and started research 
projects on environmental issues. They sold their 
expertise to companies or government agencies, and 
were funded by traditional scientific grant agencies 
too, such as the Swiss National Science Foundation 
(SNF). Today, they exist besides different environ-
mental disciplines. They perceive the universities 
partly as competitors, partly as collaborators. The 
companies employ staff from a wide range of disci-
plines. The organisational structure of most of the 
larger companies is of a matrix type.10 They are  
divided into thematic departments (such as water, 
energy or economy). Projects in turn bring members 
of different departments together. 
There are two reasons for the preference for a ma-
trix structure. First of all, the structure of consultan-
cies does not have to be disciplinary, since they are 
only consumers of disciplinary-trained persons but 
do not sell them back to the academic job market.11 
Second, a matrix structure allows quick reactions to 
changing societal demands. The matrix structure 
makes it easy to assemble different teams for new 
problems (Hobday, 2000).12 
Environmental consultancies are working outside 
the disciplinary fields because organisationally they 
are not part of the university system. This becomes 
visible also in other areas such as quality control, the 
theme of this article. Although many projects of 
these companies could equally be based in universi-
ties there are some differences as to how projects are 
accomplished. Most notably, the results are rarely 
Environmental consultancies operate 
on the borderline of research and 
consulting, being political pressure 
groups and independent experts all at 
the same time, thus providing an 
almost ideal typical case for 
transdisciplinarity 
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published in traditional scientific journals. This is 
not because the articles would be refused, but be-
cause the companies lack time and money to write 
the articles, because publications are not part of the 
tender and because the companies gain their reputa-
tion by other means.13 Because of this, disputes 
about (extended) peer review, such as those de-
scribed in the article of Michael Pregernig in this 
issue (pp. 445–455), are rare. Most of the issues sur-
rounding quality control happen on levels directly 
related to the organisation of projects. 
There are three other types of quality control ap-
plied in the companies, all of them differing from 
disciplinary quality control: quality management 
systems, timesheets and supervisory boards. Obvi-
ously these three types are not unique to environ-
mental consultancies. They exist in other consulting 
or knowledge-intensive businesses as well and they 
are well on their way to universities.14 All three 
mechanisms are not merely incremental as in univer-
sity-based science: in the absence of peer-review 
processes they provide the sole basis for publicly 
demonstrating the quality of work. 
Furthermore, quality management systems and 
timesheets are tied to the organisations; they do not 
exist in all of the environmental consultancies; they 
are a result of the growth of the companies. We do 
not find them in very small companies with fewer 
than 10 employees. They are a reaction to organisa-
tional complexity. Only supervisory boards are re-
lated to the type of projects, and not to the 
organisations. 
I do not argue here that these mechanisms are 
specific to these companies. Each of the three 
mechanisms may be found in university depart-
ments, in private research organisations or in state-
funded extra-university research organisations (see 
Lengwiler, this issue of Science and Public Policy, 
pp. 423–434). But I maintain that they are a side ef-
fect of transdisciplinarity, because they all compen-
sate for disciplinary control mechanisms and 
together form an ideal type of process-based quality 
control instead of result-based peer review. The en-
vironmental consultancies are ideal types because 
they combine different criteria which all make the 
influence of the described mechanisms more likely. 
They operate outside the disciplinary system; they 
do not form a profession in the strict sense; they do 
not produce patentable technologies; they involve 
other stakeholders in the research process; their 
fields of work are highly politicised and open to 
public contest; and they are for-profit organisations.  
None of these criteria is specific to environmental 
consultancies but they add up to a case that demon-
strates the proceduralisation of evaluation of re-
search results in one of its purest forms. It is 
important to note that although we deal here with an 
extreme case, this is still about organised and sys-
tematic production of new knowledge, and not sim-
ply about consulting in the sense of applying old 
knowledge to new cases. The projects of these firms 
are similar to those of the university-based transdis-
ciplinary researchers described in the article by 
Maasen and Lieven (this issue of Science and Public 
Policy, pp. 399–410). Environmental consultancies 
are different types of organisations from universities, 
but because of this, they do not a priori produce dif-
ferent kinds of research. 
Quality management 
Some of the companies introduced so-called quality 
management systems (ISO 9000; abbreviated to 
QMS hereafter).15 QMS are first of all self-
descriptions of the companies, detailing products, 
means of production and clients. Furthermore they 
contain a normative evocation of the culture of the 
company, stating how the company wants to work, 
how it wants to deal with clients, etc. As such, QMS 
are not explicitly connected to knowledge produc-
tion. Although a QMS could simply be seen as an 
inappropriate economic instrument to control re-
search this would miss its meaning and effects. Be-
cause a QMS is nothing but a prescriptive manual 
that can be applied to any organisation it is equally 
applicable to research. It is not specific to science 
and thus operates on an procedural level. A QMS 
adds a frame to research practices, which operate on 
at least four levels that differ from disciplinary 
framings. 
First of all, QMS operate on the level of the whole 
company. Even if it describes knowledge production 
itself, it describes it as knowledge production of a 
certain company. A QMS aims at singling out a  
certain company vis-à-vis other companies, not vis-
à-vis other ways of knowledge production in the dis-
ciplinary sense. Furthermore it aims at a positive 
description of its subject. Other than disciplinary 
knowledge production it does not relate the work of 
a company to any standard outside of the company. 
A QMS relates the work only to the standard defined 
by the company itself. The ISO guidelines set  
criteria and dimensions to be measured, but they do 
not specify a standard for these dimensions. A QMS 
therefore implies a shift from standards defined by a 
community of people who work on the same subject 
(members of a discipline) to an organisation that is 
in itself heterogeneous with regard to the contents of 
the work. A QMS is and cannot be specific to, for 
example, the questions of river renaturation; rather, 
it has to encompass all projects of a company. 
Second, in interviews, company representatives 
often explained that the introduction of a QMS did 
not change the company. Rather QMS, in the opin-
ion of the company members, are ways of formalis-
ing already implicit rules. One founder put it like 
this: 
I do not think that much has changed [since  
the introduction of the QMS] or that things 
work better now. Actually not at all, maybe 
Undisciplined research 
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marginally. Because many of the issues in the 
QMS were in use before. And other issues are 
in the QMS, but are ignored in fact.  
The effect of a QMS is not changing the company or 
in a strong sense controlling its functioning. Its main 
function is to make visible and formalise what is 
happening anyway, and to disregard it, if necessary. 
In this respect, its function is similar to the copy of 
Lakatos’ The Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes on the bookshelf of a lab scientist. 
Third, the main benefit of the QMS is seen in the 
PR effect it has for a company. 
We had to create a difference against our com-
petitors. [The clients] take the cheapest offer 
among those who deliver acceptable quality. 
Hence we got an ISO 9001 certificate, so that 
we could tell every client: “Look, this is the 
proof for the quality of our work,” 
one interviewee said. A QMS is primarily a public 
statement that the company has everything under 
control. As a PR effect it works only where it is not 
yet a standard. It is used to distinguish one’s own 
company from others. But it does so not through 
specific qualities, but through its very existence. As 
a PR effect, a QMS is relevant only as long as not 
every company has one; and the more companies 
that have one, the higher the pressure on other com-
panies and the less the relative advantage for those 
who do have one. The introduction of QMS is there-
fore part of a formal standardisation or, in the lan-
guage of neo-institutionalism, of isomorphism of 
companies (Mendel, 2002). 
But paradoxically, and this is the fourth point, the 
QMS in its details is secret. What is accessible to the 
public is only the existence of the QMS, not its con-
tents. A QMS only tells the public that something is 
done about quality and that it is supervised by inter-
national standards; not what is done. In those two 
companies with a QMS where I did fieldwork, I was 
first of all warned that the QMS is a business secret 
and that I would be allowed to see it, but not to 
quote from it.16 The reason for the secrecy is the idea 
that a QMS describes the comparative advantage of 
a certain company and to know about this advantage 
would allow competitors to imitate the successful 
company. The QMS in these companies then served 
to define the company and to stabilise this definition 
inside the company. 
For knowledge production, the effects of the se-
crecy of the contents are remarkable. The QMS, 
which is a formalisation of the companies’ ideolo-
gies, is considered a secret, whereas the actual work 
is not. Every customer, every collaborator and my-
self, the ethnographer, get detailed insight into the 
actual working of the companies. All these people 
see how projects are planned, how efficient, accurate 
and imaginative projects are handled and how the 
teams work together. The actual practice is not and 
cannot be kept secret. This is quite unlike the work-
ings of scientific laboratories where, if at all, the 
actual practice is kept secret, whereas self-written 
prescriptions of one’s work are open to the public. In 
university-based science, everybody knows the in-
gredients to do science; relative advantage is seen in 
the speed and originality for new ideas and fields. In 
environmental consultancies, the QMS is kept se-
cret, because the companies believe some organisa-
tional procedures exist, which distinguish them from 
their competitors. It is the procedures, so they think, 
that make a difference, not the results. 
All these four features of a QMS refer, as the 
word QMS indicates, to the management of quality, 
but they differ from disciplinary control mecha-
nisms. They concern a whole company and not only 
thematic groups; although they are prescriptive they 
are mostly directed at the outside of the company 
and they are kept secret. 
Money is time 
Timesheets are a second way of conducting quality 
control. Timesheets are software to calculate work-
hours and costs per project. The measurement of 
products by their efficiency is typical for industrial 
capitalism. It is an old technique, but usually related 
to processes deemed to be economic. For science 
such a measurement seems inadequate, even in big 
science. Scientific papers or projects are not judged 
by the amount of time involved to produce them. 
Scientific organisations press their researchers to 
produce something, but this stands in no relationship 
with specified results. Whether it took someone a 
year or three to conduct his or her research project 
does not matter for its judgment. This is very much 
tied to how the self-image of science corresponds to 
its way of payment. Scientists at universities are paid 
a monthly salary, which is only loosely related to 
their duties and output. Science is supposed to be a 
calling, a vocation, separating the work (not the re-
sults) from bureaucratic interference. On the down-
side the loose relationship between payment and 
output makes scientific work stressful, making peo-
ple work a lot for little money. 
In environmental consultancies a project is not 
only defined through a certain task definition, but 
also through a price tag coming along with this task. 
A project is paid (as in science) as a total sum de-
fined in advance, based on an estimate of the amount 
of work. The employment structure reflects a differ-
ent relationship to the vocation of the employees. 
People are employed on the basis of a monthly sal-
ary and, different from university-based science, a 
monthly amount of time to work for that salary. Em-
ployees are not assigned to single projects, but work 
in multiple parallel projects.  
A project then is not only defined through its 
goals, but also through the amount of work-hours 
estimated to complete the project. The overall  
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revenues of the projects have to bring enough money 
to a single company to pay all the salaries. For each 
company it is thus of utmost importance to control 
the amount of work allotted for each project, and 
furthermore the amount devoted by each person per 
month and per project. The employees are paid for 
their effective working hours, and if they work over-
time, this is charged to the company or compensated 
with holidays. If a project takes more time than es-
timated, then money has to be taken away from 
other projects.17 
The task of mediating the general revenue of a 
firm, its projects and individual work hours is ac-
complished with timesheet software that allows 
complex calculations of productivity per project, 
person or the whole firm.18 The main effect but also 
a precondition of these timesheet systems is a  
decoupling of researcher, project, and object of re-
search. Each of the three is seen from the viewpoint 
of the company as a whole and each is an inter-
changeable variable. 
So, an important part of every project is the moni-
toring of the timesheets. Every project meeting in-
cludes a section where everyone looks at the 
timesheets and explains how much time he or she 
has used for which task and how many hours are left 
for the tasks still to do. Usually a bargaining be-
tween the different project members follows, be-
cause the numbers are not in line with the plans. 
Then, in most cases, the hours and tasks are fitted to 
the project, and not the project to the people. Thus, 
hours and tasks are constantly swapped from one 
person to another in order to conform to the needs of 
the project. 
There are several notable effects of this practice 
for knowledge production. Timesheets facilitate a 
strict decoupling of the object from the researcher. 
In large companies without such technical helps it 
would be impossible to determine whether an em-
ployee has the knowledge and free time to help out 
in a troubled project. This differs from university-
based science, where persons are usually tied to their 
research objects, even to the degree that the objects 
dictate the schedule of the individuals (Knorr Cetina, 
1999: 171ff, 216 ff). 
Second, the constant monitoring and the tight time 
corset lead to an imbalance between past and future, 
between already accomplished work and tasks still 
to be done. The further a project proceeds, the less 
time is available, irrespective of the importance of 
certain tasks, which leads to the following kind of 
dialogue: 
Gerda: I’ve got the numbers here. We’ve used 
two thirds already. There isn’t much left, and I 
don’t know what we’ve done already. It would 
be important to know how much we already 
did, and how much is left to be done. 
Grazia: Well, there is quite a lot already done, 
it’s only a question of form. But there is some. 
In the dialogue we can see how money and time are 
made visible as numbers, whereas work is not. To 
know how much has been accomplished is a difficult 
matter, because it is a question of “form”, not of 
numbers. Transdisciplinary project work is difficult 
to visualise, there is nothing to count. The calculat-
ing force of timesheets with respect to time and 
money and their weakness for calculating work cre-
ate the difference between what can be evaluated 
and what cannot. This is a common feature of pro-
jects, but it is worsened, because the timesheets set a 
strict frame with financial consequences for the 
whole firm. 
Hierarchy also becomes an important issue in the 
accomplishment of projects. Older and more experi-
enced employees earn more and charge more for 
their services, which is also reflected in the time-
sheets. The more senior employees work in a pro-
ject, the fewer hours there are. Thus a project always 
has to reach a balance between younger and cheaper 
project members and more experienced but also  
expensive project members. Older, more expensive 
employees are likely to be overrepresented in pro-
jects, because they are more experienced and 
broader in scope. Thus a delicate balancing between 
the financial interests of using younger and the pro-
ject-inherent ones of using older employees is 
needed. 
Complications arise if the quality of presumed 
tasks and the seniority of the researchers diverge. 
For example, when a junior employee had to attend 
a course in rhetoric, her project partner, a senior em-
ployee, should have taken over her work for two 
days. “That’s going to be expensive, especially if I’ll 
have to work as a secretary,” he commented. Again, 
this is a general feature of hierarchically organised 
work, but again, timesheets make its effects visible 
in all its details and bring it to the attention of every 
employee. Everybody is constantly aware of the 
costs of his or her activities and is constantly occu-
pied whether the activities are suited to his or her 
position and the project budgets. 
On the level of the whole company the following 
dynamics must be tackled. The more senior, long-
term employees a company has, the higher the sala-
ries and the likelier the introduction of ever more 
The main effect but also a 
precondition of timesheet systems is a 
decoupling of researcher, project, and 
object of research. Each is an 
interchangeable variable, seen from 
the viewpoint of the company as a 
whole 
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hierarchy levels. Higher salaries increase the costs of 
projects.19 Because it is unlikely to raise the costs 
per project, the companies tend not to keep too many 
senior researchers, but rather have a ‘roll’, as one 
interviewee said, of junior employees who leave the 
company after a few years, because they do not find 
an opportunity for promotion. 
The problem of expensive senior researchers is 
opposed by another dynamic. Senior researchers 
attract work, because they are more experienced and 
broader in scope. Junior employees tend to be un-
derworked, because they cannot be used in every 
project. The strategy of employment is thus to hire 
all-rounders to overcome uneven workloads.20 
Again, timesheets do not create the problem, but 
make it visible, because they allow people to see the 
detailed monthly or yearly workload of each em-
ployee. Timesheets thus shift the attention from the 
optimal, specialised solution of projects to the opti-
mal distribution of workloads irrespective of the 
needs of the projects. They prefer organisational and 
procedural measures to result-oriented measures. 
Timesheets shift the importance from qualifications 
of individuals to the financial stability of the com-
pany. On timesheets you cannot see whether some-
body was qualified to do his job, but you can see 
whether he did work at all. 
To summarise, timesheets allow for a very com-
plex interdependence of projects and people, with 
the consequence of making the organisational as-
pects relatively important and questions of speciali-
sation relatively unimportant. The timesheets allow 
and force to judge the quality of work per time and 
do this in real time during the accomplishment of a 
project, thus inserting mechanisms of control and 
flexibilisation at the same time. Timesheets shift 
the focus from the end-result to the accomplish-
ment of a project, which is further abetted by the 
closeness to other, also strict, timescales of the pro-
jects. Transdisciplinarity as closeness to social 
problems is expressed in the closeness to the time-
scales not only of the problems themselves, but 
also to the timescales of clients. Timesheets are 
technologies to balance and adjust the different 
timescales of the clients, the problem and the pro-
ject. For environmental consultancies, it is at least 
as important to have some results in good time 
rather than good results later. 
Supervisory boards 
The last aspect of quality control I want to discuss 
here is the monitoring of projects through supervi-
sory boards. Supervisory boards monitor most  
projects of environmental consultancies. The boards 
consist of delegates from the clients and university 
professors and sometimes representatives of target 
groups. Supervisory boards are quite different from 
university-based research. They do not evaluate the 
end-result, but monitor a project in the making. The 
monitoring is handed over to a group that is neither 
part of the organisation nor can its members be con-
sidered as equal ‘peers’. Rather, the supervisory 
boards consist of people who are different from 
those carrying out the project. They are all unequals. 
Thus supervisory boards show quite precisely the 
location of companies. Organisationally the compa-
nies do not really belong to science, because they 
have to be monitored by ‘real’ scientists, professors 
from universities.21 
Furthermore, the consultancies are not fully-
fledged professions, since professions control the 
assessment of their work and attempt to lock out 
other actors from supervising their work (Abbott, 
1988). Supervisory boards can thus be seen as signs 
of a lack of autonomy on the part of consultancies. 
However, they could also be seen as a strategy to 
avoid further problems after completing a project, 
which is also the view of the consultancies them-
selves. Instead of just doing a project and handing 
the results over to the clients, the supervisory boards 
permit changes to and correction of the project in its 
gestation. The autonomy of projects is not even  
attempted. 
Closeness to supervisory boards makes it difficult 
to follow the logic of the objects. A tender usually 
lists the products of a project, and when and in 
which form they will be delivered. The products are 
listed in great detail in order to minimise sources of 
conflict between client and company. For the com-
panies it is quite important to keep these promises, 
because their reputation mainly rests on the correct 
delivery of the products.22 Changes to a project are 
therefore immediately reported to the supervisory 
board and, even if the projects take other directions 
than planned, the companies tend to stick to the 
original plans. Often, for example, there is a need for 
— politically useful — numbers, no matter what the 
project is able to deliver. 
In a project on river renaturation a number of 
measures were planned to decrease the likelihood of 
floods. After very long calculations the results 
showed that the measures only marginally mini-
mised the risk of floods. “The client needs numbers 
and now he has got them, even when the results 
show that the measures we propose do little to help,” 
one project member commented. 
The clients and the supervisory boards can also be 
used to legitimate a road once taken in case of con-
flicts inside the company: 
Supervisory boards can be seen as 
signs of a lack of autonomy for 
consultancies. They could also be seen 
as a strategy to avoid further problems 
after completing a project 
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We shouldn’t change the objects of research, 
once we have defined them. We have chosen a 
method, so let’s stick to it. Moreover, we com-
municated the method to the clients. If the  
clients want us to do something else, we can 
still be responsive to it. 
It is exactly because the plans are communicated to 
the clients that they have to be followed. The com-
munication with the supervisory board becomes a 
reason in itself. A project of a company was close to 
total failure, for reasons due to problems with col-
laborators. When a report to the supervisory board 
was due, the company did not know how to proceed 
and did not have any meaningful results at hand. A 
discussion arose on whether or not to inform the su-
pervisory body at this stage. A project member de-
clined the proposition with the following argument: 
“I want to be on good terms with the supervisory 
board and thus it cannot be a strategy not to report. 
This is not professional. Something has to be  
reported.” 
Reporting to the supervisory body has the func-
tion not only of securing scientific quality; it is as 
least as much a function to show that the company is 
working at all, and that it is working in the sense of 
the tender. It is not like in university-based science, 
where the time structure of communication follows 
the logic of objects, where at the point when  
results are found they are brought to the scientific 
community.23 
The dynamics of communication lead to a con-
stant monitoring of when to communicate what to 
the supervisory board. In one of the companies, the 
terms “to manage the clients” and “taking care of 
clients” were used for this activity. For a difficult 
client even the term “nursing role” was used. A pro-
ject is thus not only an organisational form to pro-
duce results, but a relationship with a supervisory 
board in which every step has to be reported. 
However, there is still a need for autonomy, in the 
classical sense of trying to do what one thinks is best 
for the project. Thus there are strategies to shield the 
project against the influence of the supervisory 
board. First of all, these are strategies of positioning 
oneself with respect to the supervisory board. 
The relationship to the supervisory boards is de-
fined through the unequal relationship to the differ-
ent members of the supervisory boards. In cases of 
conflict, the difference is employed to legitimate 
one’s activities. University professors are defined as  
narrowly scientistic, whereas the consultants view 
themselves as more ‘practically’ oriented, achieving 
a compromise with the other stakeholders and thus 
not stubbornly following theoretical and methodo-
logical routines.24 At the same time these arguments  
re-enact the position of the consultants as at the mar-
gins of or outside science. 
Towards the clients, however, the situation is ex-
actly reversed. Although the clients are often repre-
sented by administrators with university degrees or 
even a PhD in similar fields as the consultants,  
clients are treated as non-scientific and therefore 
without a say in scientific matters. In cases of con-
flict, the consultants often try to delegitimate the 
clients’ standing as scientifically knowledgeable, as 
for example in the following passage in a meeting, 
where the consultants talk about their client: 
Lars: It’s the first time I've made such a de-
tailed concept. We can’t do it even more  
detailed or it will be impossible to handle the 
questionnaire. My question is: how serious are 
they [the client] about this? 
Hans: [The client] has no idea of methods, and 
confuses methodological questions with other 
legitimate points of critique. 
Lars: But why can’t the client just lean back 
and say: “There are three professors (in the  
supervisory board) who have everything under 
control?” 
Hans then goes on to explain that the client cannot 
lean back because she has training in biology and 
wants to show how knowledgeable she is. He attrib-
utes to her an urge to be involved in methodological 
questions without knowing enough about the science 
in question. 
It is important to note, as can be seen in the ex-
ample above, that conflicts between consultants and 
clients are not solved with reference to disciplinary 
standards but with reference to science per se.  
Supervisory boards operate outside of disciplinary 
frameworks and thus have to discuss differences 
with a general reference to science. 
In supervisory boards the difference between uni-
versity-based scientists, consultants and clients is 
reinforced and places the consultants in between the 
other two. The supervisory board puts the project-in-
the-making under constant review, which helps to fit 
the project to the wishes of the clients and at the 
same time to keep to scientific standards. 
Conclusion 
The procedural character of these three mechanisms 
has important consequences for the way companies 
work but also for the way we conceive the produc-
tion of knowledge. 
The three mechanisms move the control of quality 
from the results to the processes. They all sum up to 
a constant monitoring of work in terms of: 
1. self-defined standards (QMS); 
2. the consumption of time and allocation of time 
and money to projects and employees (time-
sheets); and 
3. the wishes of the clients and other scientists  
(supervisory boards). 
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Taken together this particular kind of transdiscipli-
narity is not just knowledge production that is closer 
to society, whatever that might mean, but  
a new way of producing knowledge that replaces 
results with processes and thus makes knowledge 
production relational to its circumstances of produc-
tion. It is not judged in relation to disciplinary stan-
dards but in relation to very specific demands related 
to the projects and the organisation. The loss of  
disciplinary control does not simply indicate a  
politicisation of research. It is as much related to 
mechanisms related to the organisations themselves. 
In environmental consultancies, organisational 
and procedural mechanisms substitute partly for  
disciplinary ones. These mechanisms are different 
from scientific ones because they are universal and 
independent from disciplines. They do not rely on 
specific methods or theories but can be applied to 
any project. Any project of a company can be meas-
ured by the same standards. The proceduralisation of 
quality control assumes that the workflow of a pro-
ject is critical for the delivery of good results, more 
than content-specific theories and methods. In this 
respect the mechanisms are more universal than 
those of disciplinary science. 
At the same time these mechanisms are highly 
specific to the organisation. They do not provide a 
measure to compare projects of one company with 
those of another. All the mechanisms described in 
this paper are restricted to the organisations or single 
projects. They do not guarantee that the results of a 
project are true, correct or useful in any other con-
text. In contrast, the Mertonian norm of universality 
of science relates to the validity of results outside of 
their context. Science is universal because it extends 
its findings beyond its immediate context of produc-
tion. Universality is dependent on networks as actor-
network theory has shown (Latour, 1993). Peer re-
view is part of these networks; the procedural 
mechanisms are not, since they provide the networks 
for local functioning only. 
Notes 
1. The autonomy of science has been one of the central 
themes of the sociology of science, from Max Weber (1988) 
and Robert King Merton (1973) to Pierre Bourdieu (1975).  
2. A recent review on peer review as a practice can be found in 
Hirschauer (2004). 
3. Andrew Abbott observed “the nearly constant content of the 
‘disciplines’ literature, which has been decrying narrow 
disciplines, urging interdisciplinarity, and foreseeing blurring 
of genres since the 1920s at least” (Abbott, 2001: 122, note 
1). The emergence of disciplines and the call for 
interdisciplinarity are historically dependent on each other. 
4. In his overview of different definitions, Christian Pohl identi-
fies the following five common characteristics for transdisci-
plinarity: it is problem-oriented, interdisciplinary, praxis-
oriented, processual and participatory (Pohl, 2001). I restrict 
the definition here to interdisciplinarity and participation, be-
cause the other three features are neither easily definable, 
nor could they be said not to be part of normal disciplinary 
research. There is nothing in the definition of disciplines that 
would hinder disciplines from doing problem-oriented, praxis-
oriented and processual research. Just think of engineering, 
anthropology or medical research.  
5. The critique that transdisciplinarity is not new, but has al-
ways been here (Pestre, 2000), may be empirically correct, 
but it misunderstands the phenomenon. Transdiscipinarity 
may be not new at all, but only recently became visible as a 
strategy to describe certain research as legitimate ways of 
knowledge production. Before we had the very differentiated 
system of disciplines and their legitimating epistemologies, 
there was no need to define or even call for transdisciplinar-
ity. The same holds true for most of the other hot terms in 
science policy talk, such as ‘knowledge society’ or ‘mode 2’. 
We use them to describe the knowledge production after the 
full differentiation of disciplines.  
6. The material was collected as part of my doctoral thesis 
(Guggenheim, 2005), which was part of the research project 
‘The production of socially robust knowledge’, sponsored by 
the program ‘Demain la Suisse’ of the Swiss National Sci-
ence Foundation.  
7. Therefore, and for lack of space, I am not providing here a 
detailed background of the empirical material and the differ-
ences between the companies. However, it is important to 
note that there are big differences with respect to closeness 
to research, thematical orientation and size (three to 200 
employees) between the different companies but also be-
tween different projects of a single company.  
8. ‘Environmental’ issues are notoriously difficult to define and 
thus the category of environmental consultancies is a very 
loose one. The companies represented in this study were 
selected from the membership catalogue of the Swiss Asso-
ciation of environmental consultants (SVU-ASEP, 2001). I 
relied thus on the self-definition as environmental consult-
ants. Their projects range from the building of waste-heat 
powered greenhouses over the construction of sustainability 
indicators to biodiversity cartographies and river renatura-
tion. Some of the companies specialise in a single field, such 
as biodiversity or noise; others do not and constantly adapt 
to newly emerging fields, such as recently electromagnetic 
pollution or contaminated sites. The interviews were con-
ducted with representatives from companies that reflect the 
spectrum of the whole field. The fieldwork, however, was 
conducted only in companies with a broad range of projects. 
9. In the USA the boom of environmental consultancies hap-
pened earlier. In 1974 already over 1,000 environmental re-
lated companies and more than 300 “professional or 
occupational groups” existed (Nelkin, 1977: 81). 
10. This is the typical organisational model for knowledge-
intensive and project-based firms; see for example Hobday 
(2000). 
11. For a definition of disciplines as markets with names that 
trade persons with degrees, see Turner (2000). 
12. With regard to the typology of interdisciplinary research 
styles elaborated by Martin Lengwiler in this issue, most of 
the environmental consultancies could be classified as a 
mixture of heuristic and methodical interdisciplinarity. They 
all are highly organised but with different levels of cognitive 
coupling. The level of cognitive coupling is restricted by the 
often very broad palette of fields in which the companies 
work but it is is heightened by the strong role of field-
independent methods such as cost-benefit analysis, inte-
grated modeling or sustainability indicators. 
13. The environmental consultancies are very similar in this 
respect to the Omicron institute representative of the heuris-
tic style of interdisciplinarity as elaborated in Martin Leng-
wiler’s article (this issue, pp. 423–434). 
14. For a general discussion of the ‘audit society’ see Power 
(1997: 2307)], for external evaluation in the academy see the 
articles in Strathern (2000: 1652), for the case of medicine 
see Van Herk (2001: 2103). 
15. For interpretations of QMS as control regimes in a Fou-
cauldian spirit see Bröckling (2000) and Townley (1998). 
However, such an interpretation of QMS is too narrow and 
empirically QMS do not only enhance the control of the 
management over the staff but also give the staff new free-
dom (Knights and McCabe, 2000). Another interesting eth-
nographical analysis of how QMS works can be found in 
Cochoy et al (1998). For a case study of the introduction of 
ISO 14 000 see Reverdy (2000). 
16. One of the companies later loosened this restriction, impos-
ing the duty on me to decide which passages I could use 
without harming the company’s interest. It would be worse, 
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they argued, if dismissed staff took the QMS out of the com-
pany, than if I published parts of it under the obligation not to 
betray their trust. 
17. In management-consulting firms, timesheets exist but over-
time is not calculated. Thus, if projects take longer, the em-
ployees are supposed to work overtime without reflecting it 
on the timesheets and without being paid for their overtime 
(personal communication with a former employee of a big 
consulting firm). It is thus not timesheets per se, but rather 
their special usage that creates the described problems. In 
new media companies on the other hand, it seems that time-
sheets are used less often, although such companies have a 
similar structure to environmental consultancies (Girard and 
Stark, 2002).  
18. For a more detailed ethnographic study on the working of 
timesheets see Brown (2001). 
19. In the field of environmental expertise, salaries tend to be 
low compared to other consultancy work. A company can 
charge around €1,000 per day, whereas management con-
sultancies charge more than double this sum. This is aston-
ishing insofar as the work of environmental consultancies is 
rather less standardised than the work of management con-
sultants. In an interesting article Kipping has shown how 
some management consultancies were losing ground be-
cause the distribution of employees on the different hierar-
chical levels did not match the projects anymore. McKinsey 
lost to the IT-consultants because McKinsey had too many 
senior consultants, who were too expensive to do the new IT 
projects (Kipping, 2002). 
20. The preference for all-rounders is a feature of multi-thematic 
companies only. Monothematic companies do not have this 
problem. 
21. The scientists on the supervisory boards are always profes-
sors and not lecturers or assistants. The professors are on 
the supervisory boards because they have to demonstrate 
the credibility of the project to the public. However, the public 
cannot judge the work; thus it is the title of the professors 
that secures credibility.  
22. Note here that universities could do the same projects and 
then there would be less stress on delivery of products. Al-
though it is difficult to show empirically, it seems that the de-
pendency of supervisory boards makes it more difficult for 
companies to behave like universities and stress the original-
ity and quality of results over their delivery. An analysis of 
the different ways of relating to certain values of science in 
tenders of universities and consultancies can be found in 
Breslau (1997). 
23. As Maasen and Lieven (this issue of Science and Public 
Policy, pp. 399-410) show, in transdisciplinary university-
based projects a similar process is happening: the projects 
are aiming at do-ables, small portions of results that are de-
livered in piecemeal fashion. Obviously the time structure of 
university science is following more and more the same path 
of publishing results when projects are ‘finished’ rather then 
when new results are ready. Strategic publishing has be-
come an art in itself. However, it is linked to individual repu-
tation and careers, not to external supervision. 
24. One could write a whole ethnography of the field of environ-
mental consulting by following the different and usually po-
lemical uses of the word ‘practical’, as opposed to 
‘theoretical’. It is very important for the credibility of the com-
panies to show that they really do something practical, that 
they really solve a problem, etc, which is usually opposed to 
meaningless, theoretical, abstract work that is supposedly 
done in universities and bureaucracies. It is very much at the 
heart of the self-fashioning of the companies to be useful, ef-
ficient and timely; in short, practical. 
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